



We convene at a pivotal moment in world history. A burst of constitution
making is underway, not only in Central Europe and Asia, but on other
continents as well. Experience teaches that episodes such as these are brief
and rare. How, if at all, can an assembly of scholars assist the far-flung
framers?
This panel, the first of the Symposium, focuses on the constitutional
dimensions of property. Many constitutional scholars no doubt would be
dumbfounded that the Symposium organizers have given primacy to this
subject. Because I am a teacher of property law, you will not be startled to
learn that I concur in the organizers' decision. In a nutshell, private property
both lies at the foundation of a market economy and confers an economic
security that emboldens individuals to exercise other constitutional liberties.
Having disclosed my perspective, I now content myself with highlighting some
basic issues that participants in the various sessions of the Symposium - and
especially this one - may wish to address.
First, how confident are we that the substantive provisions of constitutions
matter? Legal peripheralists, who doubt that laws shape cultural practices in
any significant way, might argue that inserting property clauses into consti-
tutions is futile. In their opinion, erecting constitutional safeguards for private
property would be superfluous in a culture that informally respects private
property, and unavailing in a culture that does not. What evidence is there that
the property clauses have made a difference?
Second, if we assume that constitutional property clauses do matter,
should a new democratic nation draft its own or instead borrow shopworn
clauses from the constitution of an established democracy? In his opening
remarks, Professor Reisman asserted that constitutions do not travel well.'
This is especially plausible for the portions of constitutions that deal with
structural issues such as federalism and the separation of powers. But
substantive clauses also may travel poorly. The U.S. Constitution contains a
number of provisions that protect private property. The principal ones are the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of
slavery, a principle that ensures self-ownership of human capital. U.S. courts
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have given these provisions much interpretative gloss. Should framers
elsewhere mirror a tried approach or start afresh?
Third, might not the term property be too small an umbrella for the
protection of important private law entitlements? I raise here the issue of the
appropriate level of generality, an issue that pervades the business of
constitution writing. The organizers of this Symposium declined to convene
panels on contracts, torts, and other private law fields. Are some of those
entitlements worthy of distinct constitutional protection? Besides its various
property clauses, the U.S. Constitution forbids states from "impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." 2 Is it obvious that a takings clause renders a clause
of this stripe unnecessary?
Fourth, and conversely, property in some constitutional contexts may be
too general a term. The Russians, for example, are determining the future of
collective farms, high-rise apartment blocks, state-owned enterprises,
intellectual property, and so forth. Perhaps Russia's constitution makers
should draft separate clauses governing entitlements in each of these
resources, instead of, or in addition to, drafting blanket property clauses.
Fifth, how robustly should a constitution protect property owners from
legal innovations that diminish the value of their assets? American constitu-
tional scholars hardly speak in one voice on this controversy. At one pole are
Richard Epstein and Bernard Siegan, who read the U.S. Constitution as
strictly limiting legislative incursions into private property.3 At the other pole
are Joseph Sax and Richard Lazarus, who advise against construing property
clauses as barriers to doctrinal innovation and majoritarian redistribution.'
Should framers indicate where they lie along the spectrum between these
poles, or instead relegate this set of decisions entirely to the judges who must
eventually lend meaning to open-textured constitutional language?
I conclude by noting that the topics of the ensuing panels all interrelate
with property. The next panel focuses on federalism. In the United States,
property law is largely a creature of the states, not the national government.
The nations newly creating federal systems should weigh the gains and losses
arising from nationwide rules of property. In Russia, a huge expanse,
numerous opportunists are busy seizing state assets without legal authoriza-
tion. The legality of these seizures eventually must be adjudicated, perhaps
according to some analogue of adverse possession law. To what level of its
embryonic federal system should Russia allocate the power to legislate on this
topic? What protections of property owners, if any, inherently belong in a
national constitution?
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10.
3. See generally RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DoMAIN (1985); BERNARD H. SIErAN, ECONOMIC LBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980).
4. See Richard J. Lazarus, Putting th Correct "Spin' on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1431-32
(1993); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1454-55 (1993).
Property Panel: Introductory Remarks
The next panel addresses the rule of law, a topic that any observer can
readily connect to issues of property rights. Improvers of property require
confidence that the state will protect them from expropriations and private
seizures. Trustworthy police forces and judiciaries are vital for inducing
investment. Many of the nations now engaged in constitution writing lack a
rule-of-law tradition. Is it not idle to enact substantive protections for property
owners without simultaneously establishing credible institutions to enforce
those provisions?
The final panel is on human rights. Commentary on the interaction
between property rights and human rights has been schizophrenic. One strand,
associated most notably with Karl Marx, identifies private ownership of the
means of production as the antithesis of human freedom.5 The opposing
strand, exemplified by the writings of Thomas Jefferson, Milton Friedman,
and Charles Reich, asserts that private property is the bedrock of a liberal
democracy.6 These writers would contend, for example, that speakers at the
mercy of expropriators are unlikely to voice unpopular ideas. Thus property
issues lurk in every cranny of a constitution, at least in the eyes of a ptoperty
teacher.
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